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HEGEL ON ROMANTIC ART.

[TRANSLATED FROM THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION OF THE SECOND PART OF HEGEL'S
ÆSTHETICS.]

BY WM. M. BRYANT.

PART III.

INTRODUCTION.¹

Of the Romantic in General.

1. Principle of inner Subjectivity. — 2. Of the Ideas and Forms which constitute the Basis of Romantic Art. — 3. Of its Special Mode of Representation.

As in the preceding parts of our investigation, so now in Romantic Art, the form is determined by the inner idea of the content or substance which this art is called upon to represent. We must, therefore, in the next place, attempt to make clear the characteristic principle of the new content which, in this new epoch of the development of human thought, is revealed to consciousness as the absolute essence of truth, and which now appears in its appropriate form of art.

At the very origin of art there existed the tendency of the imagination to struggle upward out of nature into spirituality. But, as yet, the struggle consisted in nothing more than a yearning of the spirit, and, in so far as this failed to furnish a precise content for art, art could really be of service only

¹ This introductory chapter of the section on Romantic Art is so profoundly suggestive, respecting not only the relations between modern art and the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, but also respecting the significance of those doctrines themselves, as to render it one of the most important and interesting parts of the whole work. It belongs, however, to that portion (the more strictly speculative) of the *Æsthetics* which M. Bénard has thought it best to abridge. His version, therefore, cannot be expected, as indeed it does not profess, to present in full the thought of this and other similar parts. I have, therefore, translated this chapter directly from the German, and have endeavored, at the same time, to secure as nearly as possible that clearness which is so much more easily attainable in translating from the French.

in providing external forms for mere natural significations, or impersonal abstractions of the substantial inner principle which constitutes the central point of the world.

In Classic Art, however, we find quite the contrary. Here spirituality, though it is now for the first time able to struggle into conscious existence through the cancellation or setting aside of mere natural significations, is nevertheless the basis and principle of the content; it is a natural phenomenon inseparable from the corporeal and sensuous. It is an external form. This form, however, does not, as in the first epoch, remain superficial, indefinite, unpervaded by spirit. On the contrary, the perfection of art is here reached in the very fact that the spiritual completely pervades its outer manifestation, that it idealizes the natural in this beautiful union with it, and rises to the measure of the reality of spirit in its substantial individuality. It is thus that Classic Art constituted the absolutely perfect representation of the ideal, the final completion of the realm of Beauty. There neither is nor can there ever be anything more beautiful.

But there exists something still more elevated than the simply beautiful manifestation of spirit in its immediate sensuous form, even though this form be fashioned by spirit as adequate to itself. For this very union of matter and form, which is thus accomplished in the element of the external, and which thus lifts sensuous reality to an adequate existence, none the less contradicts the true conception of spirit which is thus forced out of its reconciliation with the corporeal, back upon itself, and compelled to find its own true reconciliation within itself. The simple, pure totality of the ideal [as found in the classic] dissolves and falls asunder into the double totality of self-existent subjective substance on the one side, and external manifestation on the other, in order that, through this separation, spirit may arrive at a deeper reconciliation in its own element of the inner or purely spiritual. The very essence of spirit is conformity with itself [self-identity], the oneness of its idea with the realization of the same. It is, then, only in its own world, the spiritual or inner world of the soul, that spirit can find a reality (*Daseyn*) which corresponds to spirit. It is,

thus, in consciousness that spirit comes to possess its other, its *existence*, as spirit, with and in itself, and so for the first time to enjoy its infinitude and its freedom.

I. Spirit thus rises to itself or attains to self-consciousness, and by this means finds within itself its own objectivity, which it was previously compelled to seek in the outer and sensuous forms of material existence. Henceforth it perceives and knows itself in this its unity with itself; and it is precisely this clear self-consciousness of spirit that constitutes the fundamental principle of Romantic Art. But the necessary consequence is that in this last stage of the development of art the beauty of the Classic Ideal, which is beauty under its most perfect form and in its purest essence, can no longer be deemed a finality; for spirit now knows that its true nature is not to be brought into a corporeal form. It comprehends that it belongs to its essence to abandon this external reality in order to return upon itself, and it expressly posits or assumes outer reality to be an existence incapable of fully representing spirit. But if this new content proposes to render itself beautiful, still it is evident that beauty, in the sense in which we have thus far considered it, remains for this content something inferior and subordinate, and develops into the *spiritual* beauty of the essentially internal — into the beauty of that spiritual subjectivity or personality which is in itself (*i. e.*, potentially) infinite.

But in order that spirit may thus realize its infinite nature it is so much the more necessary that it should rise above merely formal and *finite* personality in order to reach the height of the *Absolute*. In other terms, the human soul must bring itself into actual existence as a person (*Subjekt*) possessing self-consciousness and rational will; and this it accomplishes through becoming itself pervaded with the absolutely substantial. On the other hand, the substantial, the true, must not be understood as located outside of humanity, nor must the anthropomorphism of Greek thought be swept away. Rather the human as actual subjectivity or personality must become the principle, and thus, as we have already seen, anthropomorphism for the first time attains to its ultimate fullness and perfection.

II. From the particular elements which are involved in this fundamental principle we have now in general to develop the circle of objects, as well as the form, whose changed aspect is conditioned by the new content of Romantic Art.

The true content of Romantic thought, then, is absolute internality, the adequate and appropriate form of which is spiritual subjectivity, or conscious personality, as comprehension of its own independence and freedom. Now, that which is in itself infinite and wholly universal is the absolute negativity of all that is finite and particular. It is the simple unity with self which has destroyed all mutually exclusive objects, all processes of nature, with their circle of genesis, decay, and renewal—which, in short, has put an end to all limitation of spiritual existence, and dissolved all particular divinities into pure, infinite identity with itself. In this pantheon all the gods are dethroned. The flame of subjectivity has consumed them. In place of plastic polytheism, art now knows but *one* God, *one* Spirit, one absolute independence, which, as absolute knowing and determining, abides in free unity with itself, and no longer falls asunder into those special characters and functions whose sole bond of unity was the constraint of a mysterious necessity. Absolute subjectivity, or personality as such, however, would escape from art and be accessible only to abstract thought, if, in order to be an actual subjectivity commensurate with its idea, it did not pass into external existence, and again collect itself out of this reality into itself. Now, this element of actuality belongs to the Absolute, for the product of the activity of the Absolute as infinite negativity is the Absolute itself, as simple self-unity of knowing, and, therefore, as *immediacy*. Yet, as regards this immediate existence, which is grounded in the Absolute itself, it does not manifest itself as the one jealous God who dissolves the natural, together with finite human existence, without bringing itself into manifestation as actual divine personality, but the true Absolute reveals itself (*schliesst sich auf*), and thus presents a phase which art is able to comprehend and represent.

But the external existence (*Daseyn*) of God is not the natural and sensuous, as such, but the sensuous elevated to the supersensuous, to spiritual subjectivity, to personality, which,

instead of losing the certainty of itself in its outer manifestation, truly for the first time attains to the present actual certainty of itself through its own reality. God in His truth is, therefore, no mere ideal created by the imagination. Rather, He places Himself in the midst of the finitude and outer accidentality of immediate existence, and yet knows Himself in all this as the divine principle (*Subjekt*) which in itself remains infinite and creates for itself this infinitude. Since, therefore, actual subject or person is the manifestation of God, art now acquires the higher right of employing the human form, together with the modes and conditions of externality generally, for the expression of the Absolute. Nevertheless, the new problem for art can consist only in this: that in this form the inner shall not be submerged in outer corporeal existence, but shall, on the contrary, return into itself in order to bring into view the spiritual consciousness of God in the individual (*Subjekt*). The various moments or elements brought to light by the totality of this view of the world as totality of the truth itself, therefore, now find their manifestation in man. And this, in the sense that neither nature as such — as the sun, the sky, the stars, etc. — gives the content and the form, nor does the circle of the divinities of the Greek world of beauty, nor the heroes, nor external deeds in the province of the morality of the family and of political life, attain to infinite value. Rather it is the actual, individual subject or person who acquires this value, since it is in him alone that the eternal moments or elements of absolute truth, which exist actually only as spirit, are multifariously individualized and at the same time reduced to a consistent and abiding unity.

If now we compare these characteristics of Romantic Art with the task of Classic Art in its perfect fulfillment in Greek Sculpture, we see that the plastic forms of the gods do not express the movement and activity of spirit which has gone out of its corporeal reality into itself, and has become pervaded by internal independent-being (*Fürsichseyn*). The changeable and accidental phases of empirical individuality are indeed effaced in those lofty images of the gods, but what is lacking in them is the actuality of self-existent personality, the essential

characteristic of which is self-knowledge and independent will. Externally this defect betrays itself in the fact that in the representations of sculpture the expression of the soul simply as soul — namely, the light of the eye — is wanting. The sublimest works of sculptured art are sightless. Their subtle inner being does not beam forth from them, as a self-knowing internality, in that spiritual concentration of which the eye gives intelligence. The ray of the spirit comes from beyond and meets nothing which gives it a response ; it belongs alone to the spectator, who cannot contemplate the forms, so to speak, soul in soul, eye in eye. The God of Romantic Art, on the contrary, makes his appearance as a God who sees, who knows himself, who seizes himself in his own inner personality, and who opens the recesses of his nature to the contemplation of the conscious spirit of man. For infinite negativity, the self-return of the spiritual into itself, cancels this outflow into the corporeal. Subjectivity is spiritual light which shines into itself, into its hitherto dark realm ; and while natural light can only shine upon an object, this spiritual light is itself its own ground and object on which it shines, and which it recognizes as being one and the same with itself. But since now the absolute inner or spiritual manifests itself, in its actual outer existence, under the human form, and since the human stands in relation to the entire world, there is thus inseparably joined to this manifestation of the Absolute a vast multiplicity of objects belonging not only to the spiritual and subjective world, but also to the corporeal and objective, and to which the spirit bears relation as to its own.

The thus constituted actuality of absolute subjectivity can have the following forms of content and of manifestation :

1. Our first point of departure we must take from the Absolute itself, which, as actual spirit, gives itself an outer existence (*Daseyn*), knows itself and is self-active. Here the human form is so represented that it is recognized at once as having the divine within itself. Man appears, not as man in mere human character, in the constraint of passion, in finite aims and achievements, nor as in the mere consciousness of God, but as the self-knowing one and universal God Himself,

in whose life and suffering, birth, death, and resurrection, is now made manifest, also, for the finite consciousness, what spirit, what the eternal and infinite, is in truth. This content Romantic Art sets forth in the history of Christ, of His mother, of His disciples, and even in the history of all those in whom the Holy Spirit is actual, in whom the entire divine nature is present. For, in so far as it is God, who, though in Himself universal, still appears in human form, this reality is, nevertheless, not limited to particular immediate existence in the form of Christ, but unfolds itself in all humanity in which the Divine Spirit becomes ever present, and in this actuality remains one with itself. The spreading abroad [in humanity] of this self-contemplation, of this independent and self-sufficing existence (*In-sich-und-Bei-sich-seyn*) of the spirit, is the peace, the reconciliation of the spirit with itself in its objectivity. It constitutes a divine world — a kingdom of God — in which the Divine, from the center outward, possesses the reconciliation of its reality with its idea, completes itself in this reconciliation, and thus attains to independent existence.

2. But however fully this identification may seem to be grounded in the essence of the Absolute itself, still, as spiritual freedom and infinitude, it is by no means a reconciliation which is immediate and ready at hand, from the center outward, in mundane, natural, and spiritual actuality. On the contrary, it attains to completeness only as the elevation of the spirit out of the finitude of its immediate or unrealized existence to its truth, its realized existence. As a consequence of this, the spirit, in order to secure its totality and freedom, separates itself from itself — that is, it establishes the distinction between itself, as, on the one hand, a being belonging in part to the realm of nature, in part to that of spirit, but limited in both; and as, on the other hand, a being which is in itself (*i. e.*, potentially) infinite. But with this separation, again, is closely joined the necessity of escaping out of the estrangement from self — in which the finite and natural, the immediacy of existence, the natural heart, is characterized as the negative, the evil, the base — and of entering into the kingdom of truth and contentment by the sole means of subjugating this nugatori-

ness. Thus, spiritual reconciliation is to be conceived and represented only as an activity, a movement of the spirit — as a process in the course of which there arises a struggle, a conflict; and the pain, the death, the agony of nothingness, the torment of the spirit and of materiality (*Leiblichkeit*) make their appearance as essential moments or elements. For as, in the next place, God separates or distinguishes (*ausscheidet*) finite actuality from Himself, so also finite man, who begins with himself as outside the divine kingdom, assumes the task of elevating himself to God, of freeing himself from the finite, of doing away with negatoriness, and of becoming, through this sacrifice (*Ertöden*) of his immediate actuality, that which God, in His appearance as man, has made objective as true actuality. The infinite pain attendant upon this sacrifice of the individual's own subjectivity or personality, the suffering and death which were more or less excluded from the representations of Classic Art — or, rather, which appeared there only as natural suffering — attain to the rank of real necessity for the first time in Romantic Art.

It cannot be said that among the Greeks death was comprehended in its essential significance. Neither the natural, as such, nor the immediacy of the spirit in its unity with materiality, appeared to them as anything in itself negative, and to them, therefore, death was only an abstract transition, inspiring neither terror nor fear. It was a cessation with which there were associated no further and immeasurable consequences for the dying. But when personality (*Subjektivität*) in its spiritual self-centered being comes to be of infinite importance, then the negation which death bears within itself is a negation of this so significant and valuable self, and hence becomes fearful. It is a death of the soul, which thus, as itself utterly and completely negative, is excluded forever from all happiness, is absolutely miserable, and may find itself given up to eternal damnation. Greek individuality, on the contrary, did not ascribe to itself this value considered as spiritual personality, and hence ventured to surround death with bright images; for man fears only for that which is to him of great worth. But life has this infinite value for

consciousness only when the person, as spiritual and self-conscious, is the sole actuality, and must now, in well-grounded fear, conceive himself as rendered (*gesetzt*) negative through death. On the other hand, however, death does not acquire for Classic Art that *affirmative* signification to which it attains in Romantic Art. That which we call immortality did not attain to the dignity of a serious conception with the Greeks. It is for the later reflection of the subjective consciousness, with Socrates, that immortality for the first time acquires a deeper meaning and satisfies a more advanced requirement. For example (Odys. XI., v. 482–491), Ulysses in the under world congratulated Achilles as being happier than all others before or after him, because he had formerly been honored as the gods, and now was a ruler among the dead. Achilles, as we know, railed at this happiness, and answered that Ulysses should not utter a word of consolation respecting the dead. Rather would he be a servant of the fields, and, poor himself, serve a poor man for a pittance, than lord it here over all the vanished dead. On the contrary, in Romantic Art death is only an extinction of the natural soul and of the finite personality; an extinction which operates as negative only against what is in itself negative; which cancels the nugatory, and thus not only brings about the deliverance of the spirit from its finitude and state of inner division, but also secures the spiritual reconciliation of the actual person (*des Subjekts*) with the absolute or ideal Person. For the Greeks, that life alone was affirmative which was united with natural, outer, material existence; and death, therefore, was the mere negation, the dissolution, of immediate actuality. But in the Romantic conception of the world it has the significance of *absolute* negativity — that is, the negation of the negative; and, therefore, as the rising of the spirit out of its mere naturalness and inadequate finitude, turns out to be just as much affirmative as negative. The pain and death of expiring personality (*Subjektivität*) is reversed into a return to self; into contentment and happiness; into that reconciled affirmative existence which the spirit can with difficulty secure only through the destruction of its negative existence, in which, so long as it

remains, it is separated from its own truth and vitality. This fundamental characteristic, therefore, not only relates to that form of death which approaches man from the natural side, but it is also a *process* which the spirit, in order that it may truly live, must complete within itself independent of this external negation.

3. The third side of this absolute world of the spirit has its representative in man, in so far as he neither immediately, in himself, brings the absolute and divine, *as divine*, into manifestation, nor represents the process of elevation to God, and reconciliation with God, but remains within the limits of his own human circle. Here, too, the finite, as such, constitutes the content, as well from the side of spiritual aims, worldly interests, passions, collisions, sorrows and joys, hopes and gratifications, as from the side of the external affairs of nature and its realm, together with the most restricted phenomena belonging thereto. For the mode of apprehending this content a twofold attitude presents itself. On the one hand, spirit — because it has acquired affirmation with itself — announces itself upon this ground as a self-justified and satisfying element, from which it only puts forth (*herauskehrt*) this positive character and permits itself in its affirmative satisfaction and internality to reflect itself therefrom. On the other hand, this content is reduced to mere accidentality, which can lay claim to no independent validity. For in it spirit does not find its own true being, and therefore can arrive at unity no otherwise than with itself, since for itself it dissolves as finite and negative this finite character of spirit and of nature.

III. We have now, finally, to consider somewhat more at length the significance of the relation of this entire content to the mode of its representation.

1. The material of Romantic Art, at least with reference to the divine, is extremely limited. For, in the first place, as we have already pointed out, nature is deprived of its divine attributes; sea, mountain, and valley, streams, springs, time, and night, as well as the universal process of nature, have all lost their value with respect to the representation and content

of the Absolute. The images of nature are no longer set forth symbolically. They are stripped of the characteristic which rendered their forms and activities appropriate as traits of a divinity. For all the great questions concerning the origin of the world — concerning the whence, the whither, the wherefore of created nature and humanity, together with all the symbolic and plastic attempts to solve and to represent these problems — have vanished in consequence of the revelation of God in the spirit; and even the gay, thousand-hued earth, with all its classically-figured characters, deeds, and events, is swallowed up in spirit, condensed in the single luminous point of the Absolute and its eternal process of Redemption (*Erlösungsgeschichte*). The entire content, therefore, is thus concentrated upon the internality of the spirit — upon the perception, the imagination, the soul — which strives after unity with the truth, and seeks and struggles to produce and to retain the divine in the individual (*Subjekt*). Thus, though the soul is still destined to pass through the world, it no longer pursues merely worldly aims and undertakings. Rather, it has for its essential purpose and endeavor the inner struggle of man within himself, and his reconciliation with God, and brings into representation only personality and its conservation, together with appliances for the accomplishment of this end. The heroism which can here make its appearance is by no means a heroism which makes its own law, establishes regulations, creates and transforms conditions, but a heroism of submission, for which everything is settled and determined beforehand, and to which there thenceforth remains only the task of regulating temporal affairs according to it, of applying to the existing world that higher principle which has validity in and for itself, and, finally, of rendering it practically valuable in the affairs of every-day life. But since now this absolute content appears to be concentrated in the spaceless, subjective soul, and thus each and every process comes to be transferred to the inner life of man, the circle of this content is thus again infinitely *extended*. It develops into so much the more unrestrained manifoldness. For though the objective process (of history) to which we have

referred does not itself include the substantial character of the soul, still the individual, as subject, penetrates that process from every side, brings to light every point therein, or presents itself in ever newly-developed human inclinations, and is, besides, still able to absorb into itself the whole extent of nature, as mere environment and locality of the spirit, and to assign to it an important purpose. Thus, the life (*Geschichte*) of the soul comes to be infinitely rich, and can adapt itself in the most manifold ways to ever-changing circumstances and situations. And if now, for the first time, man steps out of this absolute circle and mingles in worldly affairs, by so much the more immeasurable will be the sphere (*Umfang*) of interests, aims, and inclinations; as the spirit, in accordance with this principle, has become more profound, and has, therefore, unfolded itself in its development to its infinitely enhanced fullness of inner and outer collisions, distractions, progressive stages of passion, and to the most varied degrees of satisfaction. Though the Absolute is in itself completely universal, still, as it makes itself known in mankind especially, it constitutes the inner content of Romantic Art, and thus, indeed, all humanity, with its entire development, forms the immeasurable and legitimate material of that art.

2. It may be, indeed, that Romantic Art, *as art*, does not bring this content into prominence, as was done in great measure in the Symbolic, and, above all, in the Classic, form of Art, with its ideal gods. As we have already seen, this art is not, *as art*, the revealed teaching (*Belehren*) which produces the content of truth directly only in the form of art for the imagination, but the content is already at hand for itself outside the region of art in imagination and sensuous perception. Here, religion, as the universal consciousness of truth in a wholly other sphere (*Grade*), constitutes the essential point of departure for art. It lies quite outside the external modes of manifestation for the actual consciousness, and makes its appearance in sensuous reality as prosaic events belonging to the present. Since, indeed, the content of revelation to the spirit is the eternal, absolute nature of *spirit*, which separates itself from the natural as such and debases it, manifestation in the

immediate thus holds such rank (*Stellung*) that this outer, in so far as it subsists and has actual-being (*Daseyn*), remains only an incidental world out of which the Absolute takes itself up into the spiritual and inner, and thus for the first time really arrives at the truth. At this stage the outer is looked upon as an indifferent element to which the spirit can no longer give credence, and in which it no longer has an abode. The less worthy the spirit esteems this outer actuality, by so much the less is it possible for the spirit ever to seek its satisfaction therein, or to find itself reconciled through union with the external as with itself.

3. In Romantic Art, therefore, on the side of external manifestation, the mode of actual representation in accordance with this principle does not go essentially beyond specific, ordinary actuality, and in nowise fears to take up into itself this real outer existence (*Daseyn*) in its finite incompleteness and particularity. Here, again, has vanished that ideal beauty which repudiates the external view of temporality and the traces of transitoriness in order to replace its hitherto imperfect development by the blooming beauty of existence. Romantic Art no longer has for its aim this free vitality of actual existence, in its infinite calmness and submergence of the soul in the corporeal, nor even this *life*, as such, in its most precise significance, but turns its back upon this highest phase of beauty. Indeed, it interweaves its inner being with the accidentality of external organization, and allows unrestricted play room to the marked characteristics of the ugly.

In the Romantic, therefore, we have two worlds. The one is the spiritual realm, which is complete in itself—the soul, which finds its reconciliation within itself, and which now for the first time bends round the otherwise rectilinear repetition of genesis, destruction and renewal, to the true circle, to return-into-self, to the genuine Phoenix-life of the spirit. The other is the realm of the external, as such, which, shut out from a firmly cohering unity with the spirit, now becomes a wholly empirical actuality, respecting whose form the soul is unconcerned. In Classic Art, spirit controlled empirical manifestation and pervaded it completely, because it was that form

itself in which spirit was to gain its perfect reality. Now, however, the inner or spiritual is indifferent respecting the mode of manifestation of the immediate or sensuous world, because immediacy is unworthy of the happiness of the soul in itself. The external and phenomenal is no longer able to express internality; and since, indeed, it is no longer called upon to do this, it thus retains the task of proving that the external or sensuous is an incomplete existence, and must refer back to the internal or spiritual, to intellect (*Gemüth*) and sensibility, as to the essential element. But for this very reason Romantic Art allows externality to again appear on its own account, and in this respect permits each and every matter to enter unhindered into the representation. Even flowers, trees, and the most ordinary household furniture are admitted, and this, too, in the natural accidentality of mere present existence. This content, however, bears with it at the same time the characteristic that as mere external matter it is insignificant and low; that it only attains to its true value when it is pervaded by human interest; and that it must express not merely the inner or subjective, but even *internality* or subjectivity itself, which, instead of blending or fusing itself with the outer or material, appears reconciled only in and with itself. Thus driven to extremity, the inner at this point becomes manifestation destitute of externality. It is, as it were, invisible, and comprehended only by itself; a tone, as such without objectivity or form; a wave upon water; a resounding through a world, which in and upon its heterogeneous phenomena can only take up and send back a reflected ray of this independent-being (*Insichseyns*) of the soul.

We may now comprise in a single word this relation between content and form as it appears in the Romantic — for here it is that this relation attains to its complete characterization. It is this: just because the ever-increasing universality and restless working depth of the soul constitute the fundamental principle of the Romantic, the key-note thereof is *musical*, and, in connection with the particularized content of the imagination, *lyrical*. For Romantic Art the lyrical is, as it were, the elementary characteristic — a tone which the epic and

the drama also strike, and which breathes about the works of the arts of visible representation themselves like a universal, fragrant odor of the soul ; for here spirit and soul will speak to spirit and soul through all their images.

DIVISION : We come now to the division necessary to be established for the further and more precisely developing investigation of this third great realm of art. The fundamental idea of the Romantic in its internal unfolding lies in the following three separate moments or elements :

1. The Religious, as such, constitutes the first circle, of which the central point is given in the history of redemption — in the life, death, and resurrection of Christ. Introversion (*Umkehr*) here assumes importance as the chief characteristic. The spirit assumes an attitude of hostility toward, and overcomes, its own immediacy and finitude, and through thus rendering itself free it attains to its infinity, and absolute independence in its own sphere.

2. Secondly, this independence passes out of the abstract divine of the spirit, and also leaves aside the elevation of finite man to God, and passes into the affairs of the secular world. Here at once it is the individual (*Subjekt*), as such, that has become affirmative for itself, and has for the substance of its consciousness, as also for the interest of its existence, the virtues of this affirmative individuality, namely, honor, love, fidelity, and valor — that is, the aims and duties which belong to Romantic Knighthood.

3. The content and form of the third division may be summed up, in general, as *Formal Independence of Character*. If, indeed, personality is so far developed that spiritual independence has come to be its essential interest, then there comes, also, to be a special content, with which personality identifies itself as with its own, and shares with it the same independence, which, however, can only be of a formal type, since it does not consist in the substantiality of its life, as is the case in the circle of religious truth, properly speaking. But, on the other hand, the form of outer circumstances and situations, and of the development of events, is indeed that of freedom, the result of which is a reckless abandonment to a life

of capricious adventures. We thus find the termination of the Romantic, in general, to consist in the accidentality both of the external and of the internal, and with this termination the two elements fall asunder. With this we emerge from the sphere of art altogether. It thus appears that the necessity which urges consciousness on to the attainment of a complete comprehension of the truth demands higher forms than Art is able in anywise to produce.

STATEMENT AND REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISM.

BY GEORGE BRUCE HALSTED.

At the basis of Logic stands the conception of class, the formation of general notions, the use of a word to denote the objects possessing a common attribute — *e. g.*, Geometer.

This assumes our ability to contemplate these objects apart from any or all others.

From this group we may select again those of them which belong to some other defined class, and so on.

We will represent classes by letters of the alphabet. Suppose x represents "men," and z , "geometers." Then xz would naturally be read "men geometers," and will mean such individuals of the class men as belong also to the class geometers. By an easy extension we take in all adjectives.

Suppose y means French, or the class French things; then xyz will mean all Frenchmen who are geometers.

We see that the order in which we select the classes is indifferent, in the sense that it gives the same result whatever order is taken.

In our example, if we first select geometers, then men, then French, we see that our final result, zxy , geometers who are Frenchmen, or yzx , French geometers who are men, should give the same final class of individuals. In ordinary language we use the position of words sometimes as a help toward expressing our meaning, but in this notation for Logic such help